segunda-feira, 7 de maio de 2012

Telomerase, cancer e envelhecimento The Scientist




Telomeres in Disease
Telomeres have been linked to numerous diseases over the years, but how exactly short telomeres cause diseases and how medicine can prevent telomere erosion are still up for debate.
By Rodrigo Calado and Neal Young


Link this Stumble Tweet this

PHOTORESEACHERS, HYBRID MEDICAL (MANIPULATION BY LUCY READING-IKKANDA)
The ends of linear chromosomes have attracted serious scientific study—and Nobel Prizes—since the early 20th century. Called telomeres, these ends serve to protect the coding DNA of the genome. When a cell’s telomeres shorten to critical lengths, the cell senesces. Thus, telomeres dictate a cell’s life span—unless something goes wrong. Work over the past several decades has revealed an active, though limited, mechanism for the normal enzymatic repair of telomere loss in certain proliferative cells.1 Telomere lengthening in cancer cells, however, confers an abnormal proliferative ability.

In addition to cancer, telomeres have been found to be involved in numerous other diseases, including liver dysfunction and aplastic anemia, a condition in which the bone marrow does not produce a sufficient supply of new blood cells.2 Inadequate telomere repair and accelerated telomere attrition can be molecular causes of these diseases, and targeting these processes may lead to the development of novel therapies.

Chromosome tails
Telomeres consist of hexameric nucleotide sequences (TTAGGG in humans) that are repeated hundreds to thousands of times at each extremity of each chromosome. Telomeric DNA is coated by a group of proteins, collectively termed shelterin, which serves to protect telomere structure. Because DNA can only be synthesized in one direction, the RNA primers at the chromosome’s ends cannot be filled in, and thus a small amount of DNA is lost with every cell division—a loss that occurs in the telomeres. During normal aging of an animal or in cell culture, cells divide and telomeres shorten. As telomeric sequences do not contain genes, no important genetic information undergoes erosion during DNA replication. When telomeres become critically short, the cell becomes senescent—it ceases to divide—or undergoes apoptosis—it dies.

Inadequate telomere repair and accelerated telomere attrition can be molecular causes of disease, and targeting these processes may lead to the development of novel therapies.
Telomere attrition explains the “Hayflick limit,” the number of divisions a cell is capable of undergoing in tissue culture before the cell stops dividing. Telomere length is therefore a type of “mitotic clock,” a measure of a cell’s proliferative history. Under circumstances in which cell proliferation continues despite critically short telomeres (usually about a few hundred hexanucleotide repeats), the telomere’s protective function is lost. Subtelomeric genetic information can be lost, and more importantly, recombination between chromosomes occurs, leading to chromosome instability, aneuploidy, and possible transformation to a cancer phenotype.

Some proliferative cells can elongate telomeres enzymatically through the telomerase complex. Telomerase (TERT) is a reverse transcriptase that employs a small RNA molecule (TERC) as a template to extend telomeres in cells. In this way, telomerase counterbalances the effects of cell division and cellular genetic “aging,” preventing senescence, apoptosis, and genetic instability. Telomerase-dependent telomere repair occurs naturally in some cells, such as embryonic and adult stem cells and some cells of the immune system—cell types that divide regularly to support development, maintain tissues, and combat infections, respectively.

Telomere maintenance is also possible by other mechanisms, such as the alternative pathway (ALT), which uses recombination between chromosomes to maintain telomere length. In ALT, telomeres are not newly elongated, but rather transferred from one chromosome to another, resulting in some daughter cells whose chromosomes have shorter telomeres and others with longer telomeres. The details of ALT’s components and regulation, however, are not well understood.

Telomere Timeline
In the 1930s, Hermann Muller and Barbara McClintock observed that fragmented chromosomes tended to fuse with each other, while normal chromosomes were stable, and they predicated characteristics of the “natural ends” to explain this difference. Muller named these ends “telomeres.”

Almost 40 years later, Alexey Olovnikov, on theoretical grounds, and James Watson, based on phage experiments, recognized a fundamental problem regarding the mechanics of DNA replication, during which a small amount of genetic information is lost with every cell division. In the late 1970s, Elizabeth Blackburn and Joseph Gall discovered the structure of telomeres—short, highly repetitive noncoding nucleotide sequences—in the ciliated protozoan Tetrahymena. In 1982, Blackburn and Jack Szostak elucidated how telomeres in yeast could serve as a buffer for the coding DNA during replication, and postulated the existence of an enzyme that could rebuild telomeres—an enzyme discovered by Blackburn and Carol Greider in Tetrahymena 3 years later. By 1988, the sequence of the human telomere was known, and researchers began actively investigating its role in aging and cancer. Subsequent work showed that the telomeres in certain proliferative cells are actively repaired. For their work on telomeres, Blackburn, Greider, and Szostak were awarded the 2009 Nobel Prize in Physiology or Medicine.

Telomere shortening and cancer
Most cells in which telomeres reach critically short lengths either die or enter senescence. In those few that survive, perhaps due to inadequate monitoring by p53 and related DNA damage-response safeguards, telomere repair would be subject to powerful selective pressure. Indeed, in most malignancies, telomerase gene upregulation or activation of the ALT pathway is thought to be necessary for the establishment of cellular immortality. Telomerase is so frequently increased in tumors and in cancer cell lines as to be considered an appropriate therapeutic target. Currently there are several clinical trials using telomerase inhibitors to treat a variety of cancers, but results have yet to be reported. Telomere shortening would also generate the equivalent of a “mutator phenotype” by increasing spontaneous chromosomal aberrations—from numerical changes to structural abnormalities—and would therefore increase the pool of aberrant cells upon which selection would act.


Infographic: Telomere Basics
View full size JPG | PDF
SCOTT LEIGHTON, CMI

There are many sources of evidence suggesting that telomere attrition is associated with and likely etiologic of cancer. Patients with dyskeratosis congenita, a rare inherited bone marrow failure disease characterized by telomerase dysfunction,3 have a 1,000-fold increase in risk of tongue cancer and about a 100-fold increase in risk of acute myeloid leukemia.4 In aplastic anemia, patients with the shortest telomeres (absent mutations) are 4- to 5-fold more likely to have their disease undergo malignant transformation to myelodysplasia and leukemia.5 Telomere-free ends of chromosomes and aneuploidy may be apparent in cultured bone marrow years before progression to leukemia. Furthermore, some acute myeloid leukemia patients without prior bone marrow failure have inherited mutations in TERT and TERC.6

Similarly, short leukocyte telomeres predict the development of cancer in patients with Barrett’s esophagitis, a condition in which the lining of the esophagus is damaged by stomach acid, or ulcerative colitis, a type of inflammatory bowel disease. In these diseases, the mechanism is less clear. Short telomeres in blood leukocytes may reflect the telomere length of the affected organ. Alternatively, they may be a biomarker of exposure to reactive oxygen species produced as a result of a chronic inflammatory process, which can both damage telomeres and cause cancer. Evidence for the latter hypothesis comes from the observation that cells cultured in room air have excessive telomere shortening in comparison to cells cultured at low oxygen tension.

More generally, genome-wide analyses have identified single nucleotide polymorphisms in TERT as risk factors in many cancers. In a recent report, short leukocyte telomeres were associated with increased risk of all cancers and of cancer fatalities in a large population followed over a decade. Circumstantially, telomere attrition is an accompaniment of aging, itself a major risk factor for cancer. Furthermore, secondary malignancies often occur after chemotherapy and radiation, which would be anticipated to cause marrow stress and telomere shortening. More direct data come from animal experiments. In a knockout mouse model, animals with reduced telomerase activity combined with diminished p53 surveillance of DNA damage developed a variety of epidermal cancers unusual in the rodent but typical of humans.

Telomeres and Cancer

DNA INTEGRITY: Tumor suppressor protein p53 helps detect DNA damage that may lead to cancer.
THOMAS SPLETTSTOESSER

When telomeres reach critically short lengths, most cells either stop dividing or die. In many cancers, however, telomerase is upregulated or the ALT pathway is activated, resulting in abnormal telomere lengthening and proliferative growth. Because of this link between telomeres and cancer, researchers are actively investigating telomerase (TERT) as a target for cancer therapeutics, with several clinical trials ongoing.

Evidence for a telomere-cancer link:
• Genome-wide analyses have identified single nucleotide polymorphisms in the TERT gene as risk factors in many cancers.
• Some acute myeloid leukemia patients have inherited mutations in TERT and TERC, the RNA template used to extend telomeres.
• Short leukocyte telomeres have been associated with increased risk of all cancers and of cancer fatalities.
• Shortened telomeres and aneuploidy may be apparent in cultured bone marrow years before progression to leukemia.
• Among aplastic anemia patients, whose bone marrow does not produce sufficient new blood cells, those with the shortest telomeres are 4- to 5-fold more likely to have their disease undergo malignant transformation to myelodysplasia and leukemia.
• Patients with dyskeratosis congenita, an inherited bone marrow failure disease characterized by telomerase dysfunction, have a 1000-fold risk of tongue cancer and about 100-fold risk of acute myeloid leukemia.
• Knockout mice with reduced telomerase activity combined with diminished p53 surveillance of DNA damage develop a variety of epidermal cancers.

Other telomere diseases
In addition to cancer, other diseases have been linked to telomeres. Hematopoietic stem cells express telomerase in response to the enormous daily demand for red blood cells, white blood cells, and platelets. Thus while overexpression of telomerase in other tissues can cause malignant growth, faulty telomere repair in blood stem cells can also result in severe diseases caused by stem cell failure.

One such “telomere disease” is dyskeratosis congenita, an X-linked bone marrow disorder characterized by symptoms such as abnormal nails, a pigmented, net-like rash, a white patch or plaque in the mouth, and aplastic anemia. The disease usually presents in the first decade of life. The liver and lungs can also be affected, as is often observed after a hematopoietic stem-cell transplant is performed to correct the bone marrow disease. The reasons for liver and lung involvement are not clear, but the chemotherapy used for transplant conditioning and the new inflammatory cells in the transplanted bone marrow may accelerate the injury in these organs.

Patients suffering from dyskeratosis congenita inherit a mutation in a gene named DKC1, identified by Inderjeet Dokal at the Hammersmith Hospital in London, who performed linkage studies of large pedigrees.7 DKC1 encodes dyskerin, a protein that binds to the RNA component of the telomerase complex and stabilizes it. Later, heterozygous mutations in TERC were also found in some families with dyskeratosis congenita. The severe phenotype of X-linked dyskeratosis congenita is likely due to the loss of functional DKC1 and markedly reduced telomerase function, which results in defective telomere repair and leads to accelerated telomere attrition, causing cell senescence and organ failure.2

Whereas dyskeratosis congenita caused by mutations in the DKC1 gene usually presents during infancy, mutations in TERC and in the enzymatic component encoded by TERT appear to have impacts later in life. The first TERT mutations found in humans were in adult patients with acquired aplastic anemia who lacked physical anomalies and did not have a family history of telomere-related disease. Penetrance of the phenotypes of TERT and TERC mutations is highly variable among and within families, as reflected by the severity, time of onset, and organs involved. Within pedigrees, members with the identical mutation may have minimal or no clinical manifestations, develop aplastic anemia late in life, or suffer pulmonary fibrosis (scarring of the lungs) or hepatic cirrhosis (scarring of liver tissue). Different organ systems may be affected in different family members at different times, and occasional patients have disease in marrow, lung, and liver.2 How faulty telomere repair leads to such diseases is not fully understood.

Even with the uncertainties that remain, the association of telomerase mutations with disease in such disparate organs systems has important practical consequences for patients and their physicians. In the family history, the presence of even mild blood count abnormalities, pulmonary fibrosis, and hepatic cirrhosis, as well as acute myeloid leukemia, are important clues for the diagnosis of a telomeropathy. Involvement of multiple medical subspecialties can be confusing; some patients have even made their own diagnoses after Internet searches. Telomere length in leukocytes can be measured commercially and is a reliable marker of these diseases when severely reduced. Sequencing TERT and TERC can also be diagnostic. The appropriate finding of a telomerase deficit has consequences for prognosis, treatment, and genetic counseling. But while the diagnosis of telomeropathies can be straightforward, there may be complications. Some typical families lack known mutations, and telomere length may be normal even in the presence of etiologic nucleotide substitutions. Furthermore, rare mutations in shelterin genes coding for the proteins that protect telomere structure can produce severe dyskeratosis but do not alter telomerase repair capacity. And regulatory regions of genes, not routinely screened, may be responsible in some cases.

Telomeres and aging
Telomeres shorten as we age. By analogy to the cellular mitotic clock, telomeres have been postulated as a marker of “genetic age,” and telomere length has been marketed as a simple predictor of longevity. Assays of telomere length have been bundled with recommendations for lifestyle modification and for drug therapy, neither based on appropriate clinical studies. Simple but appealing arguments relating telomeres and aging are currently controversial, likely simplistic, and potentially harmful. Telomere length does indeed reflect a cell’s past proliferative history and future propensity for apoptosis, senescence, and transformation. Cellular aging, however, is not equivalent to organ or organismal aging.

There are several considerations in relating telomere biology to aging. First, physiologically there is overlap between the shortest telomere length of young children and the longest telomeres of the elderly. Most telomere shortening occurs early in life, in association with growth, and when the rate of disease in general is low. The paradigmatic telomere syndrome of dyskeratosis congenita is not at all typical of progerias, inherited syndromes in which patients appear old and suffer diseases of aging such as premature atherosclerosis or dementia. Furthermore, the organ damage of dyskeratosis congenita is not very similar to normal aging of marrow, lungs, and liver. The marrow becomes mildly hypocellular in older individuals, but stem cell numbers may actually increase, and blood counts remain stable; and neither the liver nor lungs normally become fibrotic with advanced age, as they often do in dyskeratosis congenita patients. Although in adults, relatively short leukocyte telomeres have been associated with cardiovascular events—a common morbidity of the aging population—the clinical correlations have not been consistent, and may be related to overall reactive oxygen species exposure.

Studies in humans have attempted to relate telomere length to life span. In the provocative initial publication from the University of Utah in 2003, individuals around 60 years of age who had the longest telomeres lived longer than did subjects with the shortest telomeres, but the main cause of death in the latter group was, inexplicably, infectious disease; the persons with shorter telomeres did not have a higher rate of cancer deaths.8 Moreover, these findings have not been confirmed in other studies of older subjects. In another study evaluating a different population, telomere length failed to predict survival, but interestingly it correlated with years of healthy life.9 In a Danish study of people aged 73 to 101 years, telomeres correlated with life expectancy in a simple univariate analysis, but only before the researchers corrected for age, suggesting that the correlation was driven simply by the fact that younger subjects had longer telomeres. And a Dutch study of 78-year-old men found that while telomere lengths eroded with age, they failed to correlate with mortality.10 These discrepancies may have several causes. In some analyses, telomere lengths may have been studied as a surrogate marker of age. In addition, retrospective studies may identify “positive” associations that are random and cannot be reproduced in follow-up investigations.

The telomere hypothesis of aging also has been modeled in mice. For instance, in a murine model of telomerase deficiency and accelerated telomere attrition, researchers found that certain intracellular pathways involved in mitochondrial function and glucose metabolism were deregulated, a common occurrence in aging individuals, ultimately causing heart muscle disease. Interestingly, telomerase reactivation in these mice restored glucose production and heart function. However, these abnormalities observed in telomerase-deficient animals were not those typical of humans with very short telomeres; patients with telomeropathies usually do not suffer from heart disease. Indeed, the translation of mouse experiments on telomeres to human physiology and disease should be done with caution. Mice are not the ideal model for telomere attrition and its effects on aging as murine telomeres are 5 to 10 times longer than human telomeres, in spite of mice having a much shorter life span. When telomerase is knocked out in mice, they live a healthy life for several generations, and even late-generation animals with very short telomeres do not display the clinical phenotypes characteristic of human telomeropathies. Telomerase-deficient mice also do not have a higher incidence of cancer, which happens only if the p53 gene also is modulated, in contrast to humans with telomerase deficiency, who are at very high risk of developing cancer.

Implications for medicine
Telomeres and their repair are important in the growing field of regenerative medicine. Dolly the sheep had chromosomes with shorter telomeres probably because she was cloned from an adult mammary gland cell. This may have contributed to Dolly’s illnesses, especially her progressive lung disease. Embryonic stem cells, however, express telomerase and are able to maintain their telomere lengths despite numerous cell divisions. More recently, reprogramming mature adult skin cells to the pluripotent state has been achieved with introduction of just a few defined nuclear factors. During the process of reverting cells to a more immature and pluripotent state, the reprogrammed cells’ telomeres are highly elongated. In the first steps of reprogramming and likely in the early stages of embryogenesis, cells can elongate, and thus “rejuvenate,” their telomeres. Since telomere shortening limits cell proliferation, mechanisms that can elongate telomeres are highly desirable for effective regenerative medicine.

Telomerase expression is tightly regulated in the cell; just a few copies of the complex are present in the cell nucleus, and they exert their function during certain specific periods of the cell cycle. The mechanisms that modulate telomerase gene expression, resultant enzymatic activity, and telomere elongation are the focus of intensive research. MYC, a proto-oncogene that regulates the expression of many genes and cell pluripotency, activates telomerase expression. Sex hormones also activate telomerase expression in reproductive and nonreproductive organs, such as the bone marrow. The promoter region of the telomerase gene contains regulatory sequences that are modulated by estrogen; cells exposed to estrogens (or androgens converted into estrogens) upregulate telomerase expression.11 In retrospect, the clinical response of improved blood cell counts in patients with aplastic anemia, especially children with inherited marrow failure, to androgens may be attributable to this mechanism. However, whether higher blood levels of sex hormones or exposure to exogenous sex hormones causes telomere elongation is still unknown.

Conclusions
Telomeres and telomere repair are basic molecular processes in cells possessing linear DNA chromosomes. Accelerated telomere attrition due to genetic defects in telomerase and in the shelterin protein genes is etiologic in several human diseases not previously considered related in the clinic. These include aplastic anemia, pulmonary fibrosis, and hepatic cirrhosis. The telomeropathies, especially in their milder and more chronic forms, may not be rare and almost certainly are often unrecognized by physicians. The importance of telomere repair in tissues under regenerative stress is of special interest, particularly in the reactive responses of fibrogenesis in the liver and the lungs. The maintenance of adequate telomere lengths also may be important in embryonic and adult stem cells to enable proliferation while preventing chromosome instability, thus avoiding potential malignant transformation. Also of interest is the connection linking telomere attrition and chronic inflammation to cancer and other diseases. (See “An Aspirin for Your Cancer,” The Scientist, April 2011.)

There is still much to be learned about how telomerase gene mutations cause disease, why they only affect certain organs, and how telomeres can be targeted for therapies. Both the genetic regulation of telomerase expression and the effect of an organism’s environment on telomere attrition are poorly understood. Drugs or hormones that might modulate telomerase expression and maintain or elongate telomeres would be appealing in the treatment of the telomeropathies and in conditions in which telomere attrition has known medical consequences. Whether telomere shortening mediates human aging—and conversely, whether telomere elongation may reverse aging or prevent age-related diseases—are still controversial issues.

Rodrigo Calado is an Associate Professor of Medicine at the University of São Paulo. Neal Young is the Chief of the Hematology Branch at the US National Institutes of Health.

This article is adapted from a review in F1000 Medicine Reports, DOI:10.3410/M4-8 (open access).

References
E.H. Blackburn et al., “Telomeres and telomerase: the path from maize, Tetrahymena and yeast to human cancer and aging,” Nat Med, 12:1133-38, 2006. ↩
R.T. Calado et al., “Telomere diseases,” N Engl J Med, 361:2353-65, 2009. ↩
B.P. Alter et al., “Very short telomere length by flow fluorescence in situ hybridization identifies patients with dyskeratosis congenita,” Blood, 110:1439-47, 2007. ↩
B.P. Alter, et al, “Cancer in dyskeratosis congenital,” Blood, 113:6549-57, 2009. ↩
P. Scheinberg et al., “Association of telomere length of peripheral blood leukocytes with hematopoietic relapse, malignant transformation, and survival in severe aplastic anemia,” JAMA, 304:1358-64, 2010. ↩
R.T. Calado et al., “Constitutional hypomorphic telomerase mutations in patients with acute myeloid leukemia,” PNAS, 106:1187-92, 2009. ↩
N.S. Heiss et al., “X-linked dyskeratosis congenita is caused by mutations in a highly conserved gene with putative nucleolar functions,” Nat Genet, 19:32-38, 1998. ↩
R.M. Cawthon et al., “Association between telomere length in blood and mortality in people aged 60 years or older,” Lancet, 361:393-95, 2003. ↩
O.T. Njajou et al., “Association between telomere length, specific causes of death, and years of healthy life in health, aging, and body composition, a population-based cohort study,” J Gerontol A Biol Sci Med Sci, 64:860-64, 2009. ↩
J.M. Houben et al., “Telomere length and mortality in elderly men: the Zutphen Elderly Study,” J Gerontol A Biol Sci Med Sci, 66:38-44, 2011. ↩
R.T. Calado et al., “Sex hormones, acting on the TERT gene, increase telomerase activity in human primary hematopoietic cells,” Blood, 114:2236-43, 2009. ↩

Varias Univesidades americanas oferecem cursos gratuitos em Coursera.org

domingo, 6 de maio de 2012

Artigo da Foriegn Affairs comenta as dificuldades do Brazil com a quedas do preço das comodities, além de comparar as diferenças com a China


Bearish on Brazil : The Commodity Slowdown and the End of the Magic Moment
From http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/137393/ruchir-sharma/bearish-on-brazil?page=show
April 10, 2012

Brazilian President Dilma Rouseff at the White House. (Kevin Lamarque / Courtesy Reuters) 
Until recently, the consensus view of Brazil among investors and pundits was almost universally bullish. Under the landmark presidency of Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva, the country became known as a paragon of financial responsibility among emerging markets. Having contained hyperinflation and reduced its debt, Brazil weathered the 2008 financial crisis better than most, growing at an average annual rate of nearly four percent over the past five years. And in the last ten years, some 30 million Brazilians have entered the middle class, giving their country, according to Brazil’s promoters, the power to expand despite a turbulent global environment and to reduce income inequality even as it grew elsewhere in Latin America.
This decade of success has made Brazil one of the most hyped emerging-market nations, with one of the two top-performing stock markets in the world and receiving more foreign direct investment than most other countries. Over the past five years, the amount of foreign money flooding into Brazilian stocks and bonds surged to record levels, with inflows expanding from $5 billion in 2007 to more than $70 billion through this past January. Brazil’s rise has solidified its reputation as a leading member of the BRICS — Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa — the world’s top emerging markets, which many expect to supplant the United States and Europe soon as the largest drivers of the global economy.
The glowing image of Brazil rests on an extremely shaky premise.
Yet this glowing image of Brazil rests on an extremely shaky premise: commodity prices. The country has grown largely in concert with surging demand for its stores of oil, copper, iron ore, and other natural resources. The problem is that the global appetite for those commodities is beginning to fall. And if Brazil does not take steps to diversify and boost its growth, it may soon fall with them.
THE COMMODITY CRAZE
Over the last ten years, global markets have developed an insatiable desire to invest in emerging-market countries, particularly those in which China was purchasing energy supplies and natural resources (these commodities now account for roughly 30 percent of the money in international stock markets). According to the logic behind this trend, as China continued to boom, consuming ever-increasing amounts of oil, copper, iron ore, and other raw materials, nations such as Brazil, a leading exporter of those commodities, would thrive. As a stable democracy, Brazil seemed like a safe investment, and the discovery of major oil fields off the country’s coast added a golden sheen to the picture.
But problems loomed behind that veneer. For a nation supposedly taking its place as one of the world’s major economic powers, Brazil has proved strikingly cautious. To protect its citizens from the economic turmoil that plagued it throughout much of the late twentieth century, the country developed two signature policies — high interest rates to control inflation and a welfare state to provide a social safety net — that have placed a hidden cap on expansion. Indeed, since the early 1980s, Brazilian growth has oscillated around an average of 2.5 percent a year, spiking only with increases in commodity prices. Even in the last decade, when Brazilian growth rose above four percent and Lula hailed the arrival of his country’s “magic moment,” Brazil still grew only half as fast as China, India, and Russia.
High interest rates in Brazil stymie the country’s growth by making it almost prohibitively expensive to do just about anything. Providing an average return of about ten percent, those rates attract foreign capital, but that influx of investment has driven up the value of the Brazilian real, making it one of the most expensive currencies in the world. As a result, restaurants in São Paulo are more expensive than those in Paris, and office space is pricier there than in New York. Hotel rooms in Rio de Janeiro cost more than they do along the French Riviera, bike rentals are more expensive than in Amsterdam, and movie tickets exceed the price of those in Madrid.
At the same time, the expensive real boosts the price of exports from Brazil, undercutting the country’s competitiveness in global consumer markets. Although many major emerging-market currencies have risen against the dollar over the last decade, the real is in a class by itself, having gone up 100 percent. This may help manufacturing in the United States, but it harms it in Brazil, where the manufacturing share of GDP peaked at 16.5 percent in 2004 and had fallen to 13.5 percent by the end of 2010. Few developing nations have sustained rapid growth for even one decade, let alone two or three, and virtually all of those that have did so by expanding their share of global manufacturing, not riding the tides of commodity prices.
Brazil, however, has taken the latter path. China’s growth over the last decade made it by far the world’s largest consumer of industrial raw materials, and Brazil has capitalized on that explosion: in 2009, China surpassed the United States as Brazil’s leading trade partner. Given China’s sustained success, few expected its economy to slow or considered what that would mean for Brazil. But that decline is now under way. This past March, Beijing stated that its growth rate in 2012 could dip below eight percent for the first time since 1998. Unsurprisingly, around the same time, Brasília announced that its growth rate had dropped to under three percent.
China’s lagging growth signals the end of an era in which emerging markets experienced unusually rapid expansion, spurred by the torrent of money that began gushing out of the United States in 2003 as the Federal Reserve sought to sustain the country’s recovery from the dot-com bust. Over the next four years, the average growth rate in emerging markets doubled, to 7.2 percent, and across the globe, the average duration of economic expansions rose from four years to eight. Now, as the consequences of the 2008 credit crisis continue to unfold, the easy money is drying up. Investors will need to stop pouring money into emerging-market countries as a class and instead begin to evaluate which markets are likely to succeed in a new era of slow, uneven expansion.
STUNTED GROWTH
Given its tendency to limit its own growth, Brazil is a good place for investors to begin that evaluation. Brasília’s fear of economic overheating stems from the country’s long history of financial crises, in which government overspending produced humiliating defaults and devaluations. The cycle hit rock bottom during a painful decade of hyperinflation that peaked in 1994, when prices rose by 2,100 percent — so fast that checks would lose 30 percent of their value by the time businesses could deposit them and workers would cash their paychecks and run to the store to buy food before prices rose further.
Brazil must recognize that the era of high commodity prices and easy growth in emerging markets is ending.
In 1995, the Brazilian government finally stopped the spiral of hyperinflation by introducing the real and pegging it to the dollar. But the new currency did not eliminate Brazil’s vulnerability to regular inflation, thanks largely to the old Brazilian addiction to state overspending. The trauma of hyperinflation only deepened Brazil’s commitment to building a comprehensive welfare state. The constitution, passed in 1988, guarantees free health care and university education, and the country’s minimum wage is now so high that it applies to one in three workers. And during the 1980s, prices rocketed out of control in part because the government attempted to ease the financial burden on its citizens by linking wage raises to price increases. This generated a vicious cycle whereby price spikes triggered wage increases, which then forced employers to further increase prices. In 2003, under Lula, Brasília expanded these income protections when it launched Bolsa Família, perhaps the most generous welfare program among emerging-market countries. The initiative offers conditional cash income support to the poor and unconditional support to the extremely poor. Such assistance has reduced Brazil’s inequality, but at the expense of growth.
Since the era of hyperinflation, the Brazilian government has funded this growing safety net by increasing spending as a share of the country’s economy, from roughly 20 percent in the 1980s (a typical ratio for the emerging markets) to nearly 40 percent in 2010. It has underwritten this expansion by raising taxes, which now equal 38 percent of GDP, the highest level among emerging-market countries. This heavy load of personal and corporate taxes leaves businesses with less money to invest in new training, technology, and equipment, leading to sluggish improvement in Brazilian business efficiency. Between 1980 and 2000, Brazil’s productivity grew at an annual rate of 0.2 percent, compared with four percent in China, where businesses invested much more heavily. This is one way in which Brazil’s spending priorities make the country so inflation-prone; if productivity is flat — if, in other words, each worker is not producing more goods per hour — then businesses have to raise the prices of those goods to cover rising hourly wages.
BEIJING VERSUS BRASíLIA
The best way to see how a paralyzing fear of financial pain holds Brazil back is to compare it with China. The two countries have taken opposite approaches to development. Whereas Brazil has tempered growth over the past generation, China has pursued it relentlessly. Beijing threw open its doors to global trade, setting low interest rates to provide inexpensive capital to fund the infrastructure critical to an export economy, such as roads, bridges, and ports. These rates also helped keep the value of the yuan low, making Chinese exports more competitive. China built this system largely at the expense of its citizens; it is only now beginning to launch welfare programs meant to protect them from the turmoil of these rapid changes.
Brazil, meanwhile, adopted the opposite model, focusing on stability and protecting its people rather than increasing productivity and growth. Brazil’s high interest rates attracted foreign capital and heightened the value of the real, which undermined Brazilian exports and slowed expansion. Brasília spent that capital not on roads and bridges but on a welfare state. That is largely why for the last three decades, China has grown four times as fast as Brazil.
The difference between the two countries’ investment strategies could not be more striking. Over the past decade, China’s domestic investment, in everything from factories to equipment and schools, climbed at a double-digit annual pace, reaching nearly 50 percent of GDP last year — higher than in any other major economy, ever. In fact, China now invests more than the United States and Europe combined. Brazil’s total investment, on the other hand, has remained under 19 percent of GDP, one of the lowest figures among emerging-market countries. And Brasília spends only two percent of its GDP on infrastructure — a paltry amount compared with the emerging-market average of five percent and the Chinese rate of ten percent.
That failure to invest is a major reason why the Brazilian economy is so lethargic and expensive. The failure to build roads and ports has made even simple tasks, such as moving around the country, a nightmare. Truckers taking sugar from plantations to Santos, the country’s largest port, must routinely wait two to three days at the port’s gates because of a shortage of warehouse space and automated cargo movers. A former executive of a major U.S. agricultural company told me that trucks carrying seeds from the Brazilian hinterlands to Santos would lose half their cargo to ruts and potholes along the way. Scavengers would follow the trucks, and the seeds would eventually turn up on sale in Paraguay.
Brazil’s economy suffers similar bottlenecks on every front. The broad measure of how fully an economy is employing its total stock of labor and equipment, a number known as the capacity utilization rate, now stands at 84 percent in Brazil — five points higher than the average in other emerging markets and a sign that the supply is inadequate. Underspending on schools has resulted in a massive shortage of skilled workers. Normally, as a country grows richer, students stay in school longer. But in Brazil, they remain in school for an average of just seven years, the lowest rate of any middle-income country; in China, which is much poorer, the average is eight years. As a result, although unemployment is now at a decade-low six percent, businesses complain that they have no choice but to hire unqualified applicants. In manufacturing and services, a shortage of engineers and technical workers is already straining the economy.
In short, then, chronic underinvestment has made the Brazilian economy prone to cooling off at a relatively slow rate of growth compared with other emerging markets. If businesses must pay extra to hire competent workers or move goods across the country, then they will pass those charges on to customers. And as businesses start to compete for the inadequate supply of workers, warehouse space, shipping capacity, and other essentials, inflation will rise at an early stage of economic expansion. For Brazil, this happens when GDP growth approaches just four percent — half the rate at which it occurs in China. And because Brazil historically raises interest rates at the first signs of inflation, thereby restraining growth, the country tends to stall at that four percent threshold.
STABILITY NO MORE
Brazil was able to achieve four percent growth in the unusual global environment of the last decade, when the country finally began catching up to the West. Brazil’s average per capita income had fallen from a peak of 25 percent of the U.S. average in the 1960s to just 16 percent by the late 1990s. In the last decade, however, that number began to climb, and it has now risen to roughly 20 percent. But given the upcoming decline in demand for commodities, the rate could collapse again. Arminio Fraga, Brazil’s former central bank president, told me that he fears a “lost decade” of relative decline, similar to the 1980s, if Brazil does not shake off its “Iberian roots” — the sleepy welfare-state tendencies it seems to have inherited from its European colonizers.
The recent news that Brazil’s economic growth has begun to slow may prompt an overdue debate in the country about how to fix its high-cost, commodity-dependent economy. Although programs such as Bolsa Família have helped reduce income inequality, Brazil must realize that it could afford that initiative only thanks to the period of rapid global growth that started in 2003, the same year the initiative began. Brazil can and must find a way to balance stability with expansion. But so long as Brazil relies on exports of oil, copper, iron ore, and other commodities, it will become increasingly vulnerable to violent swings in commodity prices and to the coming slowdown of China. So much of Brazil’s consumer boom has been driven by income from commodity sales that the domestic market will not provide much of a cushion in the event of such a slowdown.
Brazil must recognize that the era of easy growth in emerging markets and high commodity prices is ending. To avoid falling behind, Brasília needs to take risks and open up the economy. It can begin doing so by spending less on its welfare state, streamlining it by simplifying the tax code, broadening the tax base, and modernizing its inefficient pension and social security systems. It can then redirect that spending to education, research and development, and infrastructure projects. Brazil should also consider lowering its trade barriers to foster innovation in noncommodity industries. Despite its status as a major exporter, Brazil is one of the most protectionist economies in the world. This holds the trade share of its GDP to just 20 percent, the lowest among all the emerging-market countries. Ending that protectionism could bring competition to Brazilian factories, while also lowering the value of the real, creating the opportunity for a revival in manufacturing. For now, Brazil appears to be clinging to its hard-won stability. But if it fails to reform, its commodity-driven surge will soon begin to wash away.

O que é o homem moderno













NATURE | COMMENT
Evolution: What makes a modern human

Chris Stringer
Nature 485, 33–35 (03 May 2012) doi:10.1038/485033a
Published online 02 May 2012
We probably all carry genes from archaic species such as Neanderthals. Chris Stringer explains why the DNA we have in common is more important than any differences.


In many ways, what makes a modern human is obvious. Compared with our evolutionary forebears, Homo sapiens is characterized by a lightly built skeleton and several novel skull features. But attempts to distinguish the traits of modern humans from those of our ancestors can be fraught with problems.

Decades ago, a colleague and I got into difficulties over an attempt to define (or, as I prefer, diagnose) modern humans using the skeletal morphology that is preserved in fossils1. Our attempt was well-intentioned: we were trying to set up strict criteria, based on cranial measurements, to test whether controversial fossils from Omo Kibish in Ethiopia were within the range of human skeletal variation today — anatomically modern humans.

Our results suggested that one skull was modern, whereas the other was non-modern (or, in palaeontological terms, archaic). What I did not foresee was that some researchers who were not impressed with our test would reverse it, applying it back onto the skeletal range of all modern humans to claim that our diagnosis wrongly excluded some skulls of recent populations from being modern2. This, they suggested, implied that some people today were more 'modern' than others. Although I disputed what I considered to be a misuse of our test, I had to recognize the dangers inherent in this prescriptive approach to modern human variation.

Today, scientists are facing a similar situation. In 2010, DNA evidence showed that after modern humans left Africa about 60,000 years ago, they bred for a short period of time with archaic humans — and, as a result, some populations today have more archaic genes than others3. These genes might be expressed in the phenotype, and may require a rethink about how and when regional variation developed in H. sapiens. Those with alternative agendas may also try to use these new data to rank modern human populations in terms of supposedly different degrees of modernity. Already I'm reading blogs that speculate about whether some groups are less 'modern' than others, and I fear that such discussions endanger the considerable progress promised by palaeogenetic research.


PEOPLING THE PLANET
http://go.nature.com/wnlxdl

So to highlight these issues and steer the debate in a positive direction, I would like to assert that the term modern humans, by definition, equally describes all humans living today. Some of us may have more DNA from archaic populations than others, but the great majority of our genes, morphology and behaviour derives from our common African heritage. And what unites us should take precedence over that which distinguishes us from each other.

Out of Africa
For the past 25 years, there has been a fierce debate about whether our species evolved from distinct ancestors who were spread across the Old World (multiregional evolution) or whether, as I have advocated, we evolved recently in only one area — Africa (recent African origin). I have argued that the physical traits of modern humans can be divided into two sets of features, which have originated through different mechanisms and over different time scales3. The first set includes features shared by all living humans — such as a high and rounded skull, small brow ridge and a bony chin on the lower jaw3 — that make it clear a skull belongs to H. sapiens, and not an ancient form. These traits had evolved in Africa by 100,000 years ago, and were exported from there in an exodus that began about 60,000 years ago.

The second set of traits belonging to modern humans include the regional or 'racial' features that differentiate human populations, such as facial shape, form of the eyelids, type of hair, skin pigmentation and physique. I have argued that these regional features were added as people spread in small numbers after the shared modern human template had evolved in Africa. The processes involved were natural selection (Charles Darwin's favoured evolutionary mechanism in his 1859 On the Origin of Species), different sexual or cultural preferences (emphasized in Darwin's 1871 volume The Descent of Man), a founder effect as remote regions were colonized by small pioneer groups, and drift, as newly separated populations diverged through random processes.


That dispersal event potentially brought early modern humans into the realms of other hominin populations living outside Africa, including the Neanderthals in western Eurasia, and Homo floresiensis and the ancient species Homo erectus in Indonesia. The first DNA to be successfully recovered from Neanderthal fossils seemed to support the view that the Neanderthals represented a lineage and species that was separate from all recent humans. However, increasingly complete genomic reconstructions from Neanderthal fossils4 and from a newly characterized group called Denisovans — so far known only from a single cave in southern Siberia5 — have shown these hominins to be related populations that descended from the earlier species Homo heidelbergensis, which also gave rise to H. sapiens (see 'A winding path').

Comparative genomic studies have revealed elements of DNA that are unique to each of the three groups (recent humans, Neanderthals and Denisovans), some of which could be expressed in the phenotype, and that may be related to such things as the physiology of the brain, skin, skeleton and even sperm4, 5. But the biggest surprise for many researchers was the evidence from whole genome scans that modern humans living outside Africa each carry about 2.5% of their DNA from Neanderthals; furthermore, people living today in Australia and New Guinea (Australasians) carry about 5% of Denisovan DNA4, 5 (see 'Patchwork planet').


The most likely explanation is interbreeding, such as when modern humans emerged from Africa into Eurasia about 60,000 years ago and met Neanderthals, and when the ancestors of Australasians met some Denisovans. Scientists are continuing to study these archaic genomes in detail, and are finding clear variation within and between non-African people in the amount and kind of archaic DNA that survives in their genomes today. In short, people living outside Africa carry different quantities, and distinct remnants, of archaic DNA from those interbreeding events. Some African populations may also contain genes from ancient groups as a result of interbreeding, as shown by recent DNA evidence6 and 15,000-year-old fossils from Central and West Africa, which have some ancestral traits such as a longer, lower braincase3.

This evidence of interbreeding between groups that palaeontologists call separate species raises two crucial questions. First, given that most of us learned at school that species don't interbreed, should we change the definition we use for a species? Or should we remove the taxonomic separations erected purely from the morphology of fossils, and sink H. heidelbergensis, Neanderthals and Denisovans into H. sapiens? And second, how does the evidence of interbreeding affect our concept of modern humans, when the genomes of people today apparently contain differing levels of archaic genes?

Laid to rest
In my view, the evidence that H. sapiens interbred with archaic humans does not yet require a merging of these close relatives into a single expanded concept of H. sapiens. Doing so would produce a species that had a range of morphological variation several times that found in humans today, or in other existing primate species. These human lineages were distinct enough to build up well-differentiated genotypes and phenotypes (although we know little of the Denisovan phenotype so far) — even the inner ear bones of a Neanderthal are readily distinguishable from those of a modern human. Furthermore, many closely related species of primates undergo limited interbreeding, including among our close ape and monkey relatives7. So, for pragmatic reasons, I would retain these species categories while recognizing that this does not imply complete reproductive isolation3.

“It is not yet clear whether the archaic DNA many of us carry is tied to any visible traits.”
It is not yet clear whether the archaic DNA many of us carry is tied to any visible traits. Are some of the regional physical differences that I argue have largely evolved in the past 60,000 years within dispersing modern humans instead the result of Neanderthal or Denisovan genes? Europeans do not seem to have inherited lighter pigmentation or cold adaptation from their Neanderthal predecessors, but what about their large noses or immune systems8? What about the distinctive teeth and malarial resistance of some Australasians — could these be signs of a Denisovan heritage?

More controversially, some of the known differences in coding DNA between Neanderthals and recent humans are associated with brain development and function4. Although the archaeological record of Africa suggests that it was the centre of origin for many innovations in modern human behaviour such as complex tools, symbolism and marine exploitation, some have argued that it was only on leaving Africa that modern humans ratcheted up their cognitive skills in response to the environmental challenges of Eurasia9. Now, instead, researchers may start to examine the possible phenotypic expression of Neanderthal, Denisovan or African archaic genes for cognition and intelligence.

Terms such as 'archaic' and 'primitive' may be considered objective when used by palaeontologists, but they can be pejorative in common parlance. If researchers want to continue the progress recently made in studying the origins of modern human variation, they will need to think long and hard about their aims, and the lexicon they use.

One thing should be reiterated: all living humans are members of the extant species H. sapiens and, by definition, all must equally be modern humans. The majority of our genes (>90%) derives from our common African heritage, and this should take precedence over the minor amount of DNA that is different — however and whenever it was acquired. It is important that we examine all the factors that lie behind our evolution, including the possible effects of interbreeding on the physiology of modern humans, but we will have learnt nothing in the past 50 years if we let small segments of distinct DNA govern the way we regard regional variation today.

See News Feature p.23


- Posted using BlogPress from my iPhone